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WHY WE NEED GLOBAL STANDARDS 
FOR CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
ALLEN L. WHITE* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
After two years of gradual revelations concerning undisclosed information 
on suicidal risks to children on antidepressants, a federal advisory committee in 
September 2004 recommended that such drugs be labeled to alert physicians 
and consumers of this risk.1  The recommendation stemmed from drug trial 
information developed by the U.K. firm GlaxoSmithKline (GSK),2 and 
emerged amidst considerable scientific uncertainty and continuing public 
scrutiny of the quality and effectiveness of the drug screening and approval 
process of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).3 
The episode began in 2002 when an FDA official, Dr. Andrew Mosholder, 
reviewed data submitted for FDA review by GSK regarding its antidepressant, 
Paxil.4  In its filings, the company used the term “liability” to refer to potential 
adverse effects for Paxil users relative to patients who received a placebo.5  In 
May 2003, supplemental company filings indicated higher rates of suicidal 
behavior among patients taking Paxil than among placebo recipients.6  
Furthermore, Paxil offered no better results than did the placebo.7 
After requesting similar information from other antidepressant 
manufacturers, including American and Swiss firms, and receiving data covering 
twenty-two studies and 4250 children, Mosholder concluded that children using 
drugs were nearly twice as likely to develop suicidal tendencies as those 
administered a placebo.8  FDA questioned Mosholder’s findings and contracted 
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 1. Jonathan Mahler, The Antidepressant Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 
59. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., Jerry Avorn, Op-Ed., Prescription Anxiety, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20, 2004, at A11 
(describing the doctor–author’s criticism of FDA practices). 
 4. Gardiner Harris, Antidepressant Study Seen to Back Expert, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004, at A16. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
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with Columbia University to review and expand the inquiry.9  The results, 
released in 2004, confirmed Mosholder’s conclusion:  the risk factor was 1.78 
among antidepressant users relative to placebo users.10  At that juncture, 
practitioners were left to decide whether the risks of the drugs were worth the 
potential gains, a decision complicated by the paucity of alternative reliable 
tools to combat childhood depression. 
The antidepressant story is noteworthy in its own right, shedding light on 
the tangled web of legal, regulatory, economic, and ethical issues surrounding 
disclosure practices in the pharmaceutical industry.  At the same time, it is 
instructive at a higher level of inquiry, one that emerges upon stepping back 
from the immediate controversy to the sources, ownership, and dissemination 
of knowledge in a globalizing world.11  The complex interworkings of an 
emerging global economy make it necessary for corporate standards for 
disclosure to be established and enforced. 
II 
DISCLOSURE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 
In the twenty-first century, knowledge-based assets controlled by 
businesses—such as pharmaceuticals, software, and financial services—
increasingly move easily across frontiers.  Although the emergence of a global 
economy is viewed by most as inevitable and probably irreversible, heated 
debates over who wins and who loses remain intense and unresolved.  At the 
same time, international agreements and organizations that reflect and 
accelerate an increasingly interconnected world seem destined to become 
permanent fixtures of international relations in the twenty-first century.  For 
example, agreements governing patent protections and world trade are critical 
lubricants in the transnational flow of tangible goods—like petroleum and 
computers—and intangible assets, such as intellectual property and brands. 
Alongside these increasing formal global connections is a still fluid and 
fragmented parallel international regime whose overarching focus is on infusing 
a moral dimension into the global economy and the markets upon which it is 
built.  This regime depends on voluntarism and moral persuasion rather than on 
legal enforceability, and it comprises dozens of codes, principles, standards, and 
guidelines.12  Many of the components of this regime are developed and 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. “Knowledge” in this paper is broadly construed to mean scientific understanding, information, 
and economic value resulting from human intelligence as opposed to physical materials.  Thus, 
“knowledge economy,” “knowledge industries,” and “knowledge assets” are terms that appear in 
various parts of the discussion. 
 12. See DEBORAH LEIPZIGER, THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY CODE BOOK (2003) (detailing 
the characteristics of a variety of different codes); FANNY CALDER & MALAIKA CULVERWELL, 
FOLLOWING UP THE WORLD SUMMIT ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT COMMITMENTS ON 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, Annex 2 (2005) (listing major international initiatives in 
corporate responsibility). 
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disseminated by multilateral organizations; the United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Global Compact, the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development’s Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Principles of Corporate Governance, and the International 
Labour Organization’s (ILO) Core Labour Standards are examples.  Other 
components, such as the Global Reporting Initiative13 and Transparency 
International,14 were given impetus by civil society organizations and evolved 
into multisectoral (or “multistakeholder”) arrangements.  Still others, like the 
Caux Principles and the International Chamber of Commerce’s Principles for 
Sustainable Development, are products of the business community. 
In the last half-century, these two emergent parallel regimes—formal 
agreements and soft law—have served different but complementary purposes.  
In the aftermath of World War II, new global entities emerged with the 
purposes of securing the peace and establishing new ground rules for 
international relations in order to avert the catastrophic consequences of a third 
global conflict.  Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, and the International Finance Corporation were designed to 
accelerate and spread economic development across nations and regions.  
Concurrently, the birth of the U.N., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the continuing evolution of core labor standards under the aegis of the ILO, 
and a host of environmental accords and conventions collectively represented 
an effort to implant a moral compass into the postwar global landscape, to 
balance the rights of those who would benefit from globalization with a set of 
generally accepted obligations associated with such rights. 
Although progress has been made on both fronts, it has been an erratic and 
uneven trajectory.  The rights of corporations to free trade in products and 
services that benefit corporate owners—specifically shareholders—are the most 
mature, outpacing the evolution of enforceable universal rights that protect 
individuals, workers, and the environment.  The ability of corporations to 
mobilize and represent their shared interests is a powerful driver of such 
progress.  Though the contours of corporate obligations are becoming more 
sharply delineated,15 the absence of accountability and enforceability at the 
international level remains a major stumbling block to achieving parity between 
rights and obligations.  As recently as September 2004, U.N. Secretary General 
Kofi Annan made this point before the U.N. General Assembly:  “Those who 
 
 13. See infra, footnotes 47–48, 51–76, and accompanying text. 
 14. Transparency International, a Berlin-based international civil society organization focused on 
the elimination of corruption in all sectors of society.  See http://www.transparency.org/ 
 15. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights, Sub-Comm. on 
Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights, 4–6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003), available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G03/160/08/PDF/G0316008.pdf (detailing the 
responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises). 
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seek to bestow legitimacy must themselves embody it, and those who invoke 
international law must themselves submit to it.”16 
III 
KNOWLEDGE AND EARLY WEALTH CREATION 
For most of the five centuries since the conception of the earliest 
corporations in Europe, wealth generation has been measured principally by 
tangible assets—buildings, equipment, materials, and inventory of intermediate 
and final products.  Indeed, the early joint partnerships—the precursor to the 
modern limited liability corporation—brought together clusters of investors 
whose goals were to discover, transport, and trade as many physical assets as 
possible.17  These assets were human and nonhuman in nature, ranging from the 
minerals and crops from the East and West Indies to the human slave trade 
between Africa, Latin America, and the United States.  For some players, the 
wealth creation was in the transaction itself. 
At the dawn of the industrial revolution in the mid-eighteenth century, the 
nature of wealth began to shift rapidly as new types of physical assets rose to 
the top of the value chain.18  Raw ingredients gave way to intermediate 
products, such as machinery and steam power, and final goods, like textiles and 
spirits.  This created a new type of wealth through value-added manufacturing 
processes.19  Along with this historical transformation, applied science played a 
critical role in enabling the shift from cottage to factory production.  The 
invention of the steam engine in 1712, arguably the most seminal development 
of the early industrial era, increased the capacity and speed of processing raw 
materials into intermediate and final products to unprecedented scales.  The 
science and engineering embodied in such inventions was indispensable to the 
sweeping economic transformation of the late eighteenth century.  However, 
the returns to the original inventors paled relative to those of the entrepreneurs 
who applied breakthrough technologies to new production capacity.20 
Wealth creation of this nature and scale spurred a parallel transformation in 
the character of the corporation itself.  As new technology unleashed seemingly 
limitless potential for wealth generation, a wave of capital needs and capital 
owners’ rights swiftly followed.21  To meet such needs, the modern limited 
liability corporation gradually displaced the joint stock company, in which small 
numbers of investors were close to or directly supervised the corporation’s day-
 
 16. Warren Hoge, The Reach of War: United Nations; Annan Reiterates His Misgivings About 
Legality of War in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2004, at A10. 
 17. See PAUL FRENTROP, A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1602–2002), 49–52 (2002) 
(discussing the Dutch East India Company). 
 18. See DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS, 186–94 (1998). 
 19. See id. 
 20. See generally, BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC 
GROWTH, 52–56 (2005). 
 21. See generally, FRENTROP, supra note 17, at 163–218. 
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to-day operations.22  This shift occurred because the scale of capital required to 
support expansion outpaced the capital resources contributed by limited 
numbers of shareholders. 
IV 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE CORPORATE FORM 
By the mid-nineteenth century, the corporate landscape began to shift 
rapidly.  In the ensuing decades, limited liability corporations emerged as the 
corporate form of choice,23 capable of attracting virtually unlimited capital for 
economic expansion while protecting any single investor from losses beyond the 
original investment, regardless of what happened to the corporation as whole.  
As detached investors became the predominant owners, their sheer numbers 
led to the continuous shift of decisionmaking power to corporate management 
with minimal oversight from those holding stock in the company. 
The next phase of corporate transformation in the United States was 
triggered by a series of legal actions and judicial decisions in the last years of the 
1800s and the first decade of the 1900s.  For example, in 1886, the Supreme 
Court held that corporations were “persons” with constitutional protections 
equivalent to those of humans (even though the term “corporation” does not 
appear in the U.S. Constitution).24  Additionally, New Jersey and Delaware 
initiated legislation at the state level to become a choice state for chartering 
corporations (though the two laws have proven to have anything but 
synonymous results).25  Competition included measures such as abandoning the 
scope of activities and time limitations in corporate charters, loosening controls 
on mergers and acquisitions, and terminating restrictions on companies holding 
stock in other companies.26 
The collective impact of these actions, coupled with personhood status and 
the entrenchment of limited liability, defines the corporate form that today 
dominates the United States and the most advanced countries.  Country-by-
country variations persist,27 but these differences are relatively minor compared 
to the core characteristics that are largely shared across industrial nations. 
By the 1920s, the damage from largely unbridled corporate rights with 
minimum responsibilities began to surface.  The idea that corporations could 
 
 22. JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 13 
(2004). 
 23. Id. at 14. 
 24. Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
 25. BAKAN, supra note 22, at 13–14. 
 26. Id. at 14. 
 27. Corporate charters (or their equivalent) are issued by central governments in the United 
Kingdom and France, in contrast to the United States and Canada, where charters are a state and 
provincial function.  On the matter of ownership, shares in large American firms tend to be dominated 
by pension funds, insurance companies, and private equity groups, whereas continental European firms 
are frequently controlled by banks, other corporations, and insurance companies. 
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and should be left largely unregulated came under a wave of scrutiny.28  
Triggered by a backlash against deplorable labor practices, monopolies, and 
oligopolies, and by sheer unfettered growth, the notion that government had a 
legitimate role in regulating corporate behavior gradually took hold.29  As 
corporations such as AT&T, General Motors, Standard Oil, and United States 
Rubber witnessed unprecedented expansion, profitability, and influence, 
anxiety about the long-term trajectory and social repercussions became 
increasingly prominent.  Labor unrest was perhaps the most visible 
manifestation of this anxiety.  Then came the stock market crash in 1929.  This 
event, after three decades of no noteworthy government intervention, such as 
antitrust legislation, marked a turning point in government–business–society 
relations. 
With the stock market collapse and the onset of the Great Depression, 
public regulation of many corporate practices became inevitable.  The ensuing 
governmental activism profoundly reshaped not just government–business 
relationships, but government–labor relationships as well.  The negative social 
consequences of unrestrained free markets spurred action to create, for the first 
time, a safety net in the form of social security and fair labor standards, as well 
as public works programs to alleviate an intensifying unemployment crisis.  
President Roosevelt’s New Deal, unlike the more incremental legal and 
regulatory reforms of the prior decades, replaced the market’s “invisible hand” 
with the “very visible, and benevolent, hand of government.”30 
V 
THE DEBUT OF STANDARDIZED DISCLOSURE 
This redefinition of the government’s role produced another seminal 
outcome—the development of the idea that publicly held corporations must 
report their financial condition to their shareholders through regular, 
consistent, and audited disclosures.  The absence of such disclosure 
requirements before the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in the 1930s in retrospect seems astonishing since their absence was a 
powerful force in the collapse of the capital market.  By the early 1930s, even 
large corporations recognized that markets without reliable information could 
not survive and that such conditions would undermine legitimacy and ultimately 
lead to even more aggressive governmental intervention. 
Thus, the foundations of modern corporate financial reporting were put in 
place.  They continue to evolve, spawning and redefining numerous 
professional and quasi-professional organizations such as the Federal 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the American Institute of Certified 
 
 28. BAKAN, supra note 22, at 17. 
 29. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1991). 
 30. BAKAN, supra note 22, at 86. 
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Public Accountants.  Although detailed definitions, protocols, and—most 
relevant to this paper—the scope of such reporting remain a work in progress, 
the basic notion of standardized reporting is a fixture in the nexus of 
government–business–societal relations. 
A. New Forms of Knowledge and Value Creation 
The dominant corporate form has remained largely unchanged during the 
twentieth century, but the source of wealth creation has not.  In the United 
States, as in most industrial nations, profound structural changes have occurred 
in the makeup of the national economy, the role of knowledge in wealth 
creation, and the associated assets that business creates and seeks to protect. 
Structural changes in the nation’s economy began in earnest after World 
War II.  The industrial economy shifted from one dependent on materials used 
to create physical products to a knowledge-based economy in which value is 
rooted in human intelligence.  Thus, medical instruments and semiconductors 
have displaced machine tools and appliances as leading industrial sectors. 
Even within traditional industries, value is now created in new knowledge-
based ways.  Auto manufacturers, witnessing a convergence in price and quality 
across producers, are investing major resources in technological innovation for 
hybrid-fuel vehicles and in-car electronics such as global-positioning systems 
and rear-seat entertainment systems.  Segments of the chemical industry are 
shifting dramatically away from bulk (commodity) chemicals to science-
intensive, advanced materials and biotechnology.  The pharmaceutical sector, 
by nature knowledge-based, has been very profitable in the last few years.  It 
regularly forms alliances, partnerships, and joint ventures with kindred 
industries such as biotechnology, diagnostics, health care, and information 
services—all knowledge-based, rather than materials-intensive, sectors.  Alan 
Greenspan, Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, put it succinctly:  
“An ever-increasing share of GDP [gross domestic product] has reflected the 
value of ideas more than material substance or manual labor.”31 
Knowledge is perhaps the most prominent intangible asset reshaping value 
creation, but it is not the only one.  Other similar assets include brand equity, 
reputation, networks, alliances, and supply chain management systems.  These 
collectively drive company profitability and market value in ways that defy 
traditional economics and accounting methods rooted in physical assets. 
Paradoxically, quantitative measures of the scientific, technological, and 
innovative capacity, or any other surrogate for knowledge-driven value 
creation, rarely appear in company annual reports in a consistent and 
comparable manner.  Balance sheets remain notably unbalanced when it comes 
to disclosing the quantity and quality of all forms of human capital.  Thus, the 
 
 31. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Washington Economic Policy 
Conference of the National Association for Business: The Challenge of Measuring and Modeling a 
Dynamic Economy (Mar. 27, 2001), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/ 
speeches/2001/20010327/default.htm. 
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market value32 of a large company such as Microsoft, Intel, Cisco, or General 
Electric often greatly exceeds its “book” value, which is dominated by 
traditional physical assets.33  Although this discrepancy is not entirely 
attributable to knowledge assets, it is a particularly powerful determinant in 
science- and technology-based companies.  Consistent with this overall trend, 
1997 marked the first time in U.S. history that investments in intangibles such as 
research and development (R&D), training, and brands, estimated at 
approximately $1 trillion, exceeded investments in property, plant, equipment, 
and other tangibles.34 
B. Corporations as Knowledge Gatekeepers 
The shift to a knowledge economy has not been a seamless and smooth 
economic transformation, as the collapse of the dot-com sector vividly 
demonstrates.  However, it is surely a trend that will continue in the United 
States and other industrial nations.  In the view of many, the trend will similarly 
accelerate in the coming decades in key emerging economies such as India and 
China that already are shifting from materials to knowledge as a key source of 
wealth creation.35 
Developed countries will continue to rely increasingly on scientific and 
technological innovation to create and supply product and service markets.  
Efficiency gains in production processes combined with longevity gains in the 
lifespan of products tend to neutralize cost and quality differentiation among 
companies that produce comparable products.  This leaves the application of 
cutting-edge science and technology—the next-generation computer chip, a 
breakthrough HIV–AIDS drug, a hydrogen vehicle—as a future driver of value 
creation.  Even in developing countries, “appropriate” technology is likely to 
play a leading role in meeting the basic needs of the world’s poor for food, 
potable water, shelter, health services, and education.  Computer-based 
education and literacy programs, microenterprises based on mobile phones, and 
small-scale, dispersed renewable photovoltaic electricity production are 
examples of knowledge-based innovations that will potentially alleviate poverty 
while offering business opportunities for local, national, and multinational 
entrepreneurship.36 
 
 32. Market value is calculated by multiplying the value per share by the number of shares. 
 33. See generally JAMES E. POST, LEE E. PRESTON & SYBILLE SACHS, REDEFINING THE 
CORPORATION; STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL WEALTH 35–56 (2002). 
 34. JONATHAN LOW & PAM COHEN KALAFUT, INVISIBLE ADVANTAGE: HOW INTANGIBLES ARE 
DRIVING BUSINESS PERFORMANCE 27 (2002). 
 35. Informational technology and low-cost medical technology are examples of rapidly expanding 
sectors in both India and China.  See Manjeet Kripalani, Getting the Best to the Masses; A Wave of 
Innovation is Yielding High-Quality Goods that India’s Poor Can Afford, BUS. WK., Oct. 11, 2004, at 
174. 
 36. See generally, C.K. PRAHALAD, THE FORTUNE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID: 
ERADICATING POVERTY THROUGH PROFITS (2005) (detailing a series of case studies of knowledge-
based enterprises that are alleviating poverty). 
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As these trends unfold, the evidence of financial returns to knowledge assets 
emerges.37  A clear association exists between patent activity and share price as 
well as patent activity and market-to-book ratios.38  Consistent with these 
findings are other, related results: overall returns to R&D exceed corporate cost 
of capital, and returns to basic (fundamental) research are substantially higher 
than returns to applied and process R&D.39  Thus, the further upstream the 
knowledge creation, the greater the interest of investors. 
The implications of these trends for protecting and commercializing 
knowledge are profound.  As the relationship between knowledge-based assets 
and financial returns becomes clearer, so too will the pressure on corporations 
to protect such assets and to seek assets they do not yet control.  This 
phenomenon is not new.  The entire infrastructure that protects intellectual 
property, for example, is premised on the notions that knowledge owners 
deserve property rights and that such protections are in the public interest 
because they reward and stimulate new inventions.40 
Thus, as knowledge assets play an increasingly powerful role in the national 
and global economy, the stakes to secure and extend protective measures will 
increase commensurately.  It is no surprise that some of the most divisive 
episodes in international economic relations center on protection of property 
rights.  Illustrative cases include consumer entertainment products in China, 
generic drug manufacturing in India, and European Union actions against 
Microsoft’s product protections.  A telling case is the conflict between 
pharmaceutical company Abbott Laboratories and the government of Brazil 
concerning the price of Abbott’s HIV–AIDS drug, Kaletra.  The government, 
whose policy of providing free drugs to all needy HIV–AIDS patients signifies a 
major expense, threatened to break patent protection if Abbott did not lower 
the price of the drug.41  This and other examples reflect the unsettled state of 
international rules, as well as the pressure to agree on rules that protect what 
companies—and evidently investors—perceive as essential sources of future 
value in the global economy. 
C. The Cost of Nondisclosure 
What, then, may be said of the social cost of nondisclosure?  The 1929 stock 
market crash was a stark, early episode of the consequences of the lack of 
transparency.  This episode was a harbinger of a continuous debate over 
 
 37. BARUCH LEV, INTANGIBLES: MANAGEMENT, MEASUREMENT, AND REPORTING 132 (2001). 
 38. Id. at 60.  Market-to-book ratio is an indicator of the spread between investor perception of 
company prospects and the totality of its conventional, largely tangible assets. 
 39. Id. at 61–62.  Cost of capital is how much a corporation pays to borrow money or raise equity 
capital.  “In process R&D refers to research and technology projects in the development process that 
are acquired by business enterprises, often with other tangible and intangible assets.”  Id. at 87. 
 40. This was recognized over two centuries ago by the founding fathers and enshrined in the U.S. 
Constitution by enabling Congress to secure “for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 41. Todd Benson, Brazil Says Deal on Drug Isn’t Assured, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2005, at C13. 
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corporate disclosure that to this day remains unsettled and observable in local, 
national, and global corporate activities. 
From the vantage point of the scope of disclosures, the inadequacies of 
conventional financial reporting become more acute with each step toward a 
knowledge-based economy.  The gap is widening between accounting methods, 
measurement tools, and financial reporting on the one hand, and the sources of 
value creation through knowledge assets on the other.  Under the umbrella of 
“information asymmetries,” Baruch Lev42 suggests the following adverse 
consequences for one key stakeholder, the investor community, as well as 
society in general: 
(1) Abnormal gains to informed investors—as, for example, when managers 
hold internal information on the early results of drug trials that, once 
made public, will increase the value of the stock they hold in the 
company; 
(2) Deterioration in investors’ confidence in the integrity of markets, 
leading to suboptimal trading volumes and transactions and low overall 
efficiency in resource allocation across sectors and companies; 
(3) Increasing cost of capital, owing to higher perceived risk, driving 
investors to seek higher returns to offset such higher risk of companies 
with substandard disclosure practices.  This translates to higher costs of 
goods and services for society as a whole. 43 
Corroborative findings have appeared recently in studies by ratings 
organizations that assess the risk and investment quality of publicly traded 
companies.44  Telling evidence appeared as early as the mid-1960s when over-
the-counter markets saw a dramatic reduction in stock price volatility once 
mandatory disclosure standards were imposed.45  More recently, a 2002 
Standard & Poor’s analysis of the disclosure practices of 1500 companies found 
that the “amount of information companies provide in their annual reports is 
correlated to market risk and valuations.”46  Specifically, greater disclosure led 
to a higher price-to-book ratio and the ability to lower the cost of capital.47 
More specific to disclosures of a social and environmental nature is the 
financial performance of corporations that publish annual “sustainability 
reports” using the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) framework.  The GRI 
 
 42. Baruch Lev is the Philip Bardes Professor of Accounting and Finance with the Stern School of 
Business at New York University, Director of the Vincent C. Ross Center for Research, and a 
consultant to numerous corporations and investors.  He is the award-winning author of several books 
and various research studies published in leading accounting, finance, and economic journals. 
 43. LEV, supra note 37, at 93–98. 
 44. See, e.g., SANDEEP A. PATEL & GEORGE S. DALLAS, STANDARD & POOR’S, TRANSPARENCY 
AND DISCLOSURE: OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY AND STUDY RESULTS-UNITED STATES 11–14, 
(2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=422800 (concluding that greater disclosure leads to lower 
cost of capital and market volatility). 
 45. Allen Ferrel, Measuring The Effects of Mandated Disclosure, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 369, 377 
(2004). 
 46. PATEL & DALLAS, supra note 44, at 4. 
 47. Id. 
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guidelines cover a wide range of environmental, social, and economic indicators 
that reach well beyond conventional financial reporting.48  Among these 
indicators are many that act as rough proxies for the knowledge assets of the 
organization.  Recent findings indicate that among the companies that have 
used the GRI framework—more than 800 in over forty countries—a moderately 
positive correlation exists between the use of the GRI and lower share-price 
volatility, higher operating profits, and greater revenue growth.49 
Collectively, these findings point to two critical aspects of the linkage 
between disclosure, value, and assets.  First, in general, higher standards of 
disclosure build confidence and efficiency in capital markets.  The attendant 
benefits accrue to investors, at minimum, and to other stakeholders such as 
employees and customers, at best, depending on how these benefits are 
ultimately allocated across stakeholder groups.  Second, disclosures specifically 
related to the quantity and quality of knowledge-based assets—capacity to 
innovate, resources dedicated to human capital such as employee training and 
education, and levels of R&D expenditures—contribute to value creation.  The 
convergence of these two streams suggests that public policies that drive higher 
standards of nonfinancial disclosure, especially those relating to knowledge-
based assets, are likely to yield a range of social benefits that have yet to 
achieve rigorous measurement and full disclosure. 
V 
EMERGING INTERNATIONAL DISCLOSURE STANDARDS 
Amidst a rising tide of questions surrounding the role of corporations in a 
globalizing economy, disclosure standards are a key, cross-cutting dimension 
that intersects many emerging themes of the “corporate responsibility” 
agenda.50  Issues such as corporate governance, fair labor standards, and 
environmental impacts are actively debated in business, civic, labor, and 
governmental circles.  Intersecting all these issues is the question of disclosure. 
What should be the scope and content of such disclosures?  In what form?  To 
whom?  Through what media?  And how can readers be assured that the 
information is complete, accurate, and material to their needs? 
These challenges have led to a multitude of principles, guidelines, and 
standards that are gradually elevating the idea of corporate disclosure to a 
 
 48. See Global Reporting Initiative, http://www.globalreporting.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).  
GRI is a multi-stakeholder initiative officially launched in April 2002 as an institution in partnership 
with the United Nations Environmental Program.  The initiative is widely viewed as the emerging 
global standard in nonfinancial reporting.  The author is co-founder and was former Acting Chief 
Executive Officer of GRI between 1998 and 2002. 
 49. LUCY GREEVES & DAVID LADIPO, ADDED VALUES? MEASURING THE ‘VALUE 
RELEVANCE’ OF SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 5 (2004). 
 50. For an overview of this agenda, see Business for Social Responsibility, http://www.bsr.org (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2006). 
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global norm.51  Rooted in the “right-to-know” movement in the United States, 
strengthened by related initiatives in the European Community in the 1990s, 
and brought to the global stage via the “corporate accountability” theme at the 
United Nation’s 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg, corporate disclosure is now a central element in the ongoing 
debates about the role and responsibilities of corporations in the twenty-first 
century.  Meanwhile, the episodes of Enron, WorldCom, Royal Ahold, 
Parmalat, and similar transparency and governance failures that have occurred 
since 2000, while most directly related to traditional financial information, have 
had the spillover effect of deepening concerns regarding the quality of 
corporate reporting of nonfinancial information. 
Among these many initiatives, the GRI is particularly relevant to the 
knowledge assets on which this paper is focused.52  The GRI was conceived in 
1997 by the Coalition of Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES), a 
Boston-based environmental advocacy group, with technical support from 
Tellus Institute, a Boston-based think-tank.  In fewer than five years, the GRI 
grew from a bold but untested vision to a leading international-standards 
institution for nonfinancial corporate reporting.  Approximately analogous to 
the London-based International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), whose 
mission is to harmonize global accounting rules,53 the GRI’s mission is to create 
and continually enhance a generally accepted framework for reporting social, 
environmental, and economic (apart from financial) performance at the 
organizational level.54 
The GRI story is instructive for several reasons.  First, the initiative was 
conceived and brought to fruition under the leadership of civic organizations, 
rather than business or government.55  After a decade of disparate, national-
 
 51. This proliferation of corporate responsibility initiatives has lead to a wide, and some argue 
bewildering, array of possible solutions.  These include codes and principles of corporate conduct that 
establish broad behavioral norms, reporting standards that describe the content of disclosed 
information, and management and standards that specify specific expectations or targets for 
corporations to achieve relative to social, environmental, and governance procedures, activities, and 
outcomes. 
 52. Other leading, complementary initiatives with a prominent disclosure component are The 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, see Leipziger, supra note 12, at 52–67; The OECD 
Corporate Governance Principles, see id. at 324–30; and AccountAbility 1000 Framework and 
AccountAbility 1000 Assurance Standard, see id. at 374–424. 
 53. International Accounting Standards Board, About Us, http://www.iasb.org/about/index.asp 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2006). 
 54. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES 2002 1–3 (2002), 
available at http://www.globalreporting.org/guidelines/2002/gri_2002_guidelines.pdf. 
 55. The GRI positioned itself as a voluntary initiative, seeking to build a strong coalition of 
business and nonbusiness groups while advancing the case for a generally accepted framework of 
voluntary nonfinancial reporting.  As the program evolved, governments—especially in Europe and 
Japan—became increasingly attentive to the GRI’s progress.  Governments’ embrace of nonfinancial 
reporting, and of the GRI specifically, continues to intensify and expand.  Examples abound: in France 
mandatory social and environmental reporting applies to all companies listed on the Paris Stock 
Exchange, Australia has adopted a voluntary national environmental reporting framework based 
heavily on the GRI, the South Africa King Commission on Corporate Governance advocates the GRI 
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level efforts to strengthen social and environmental disclosure,56 the GRI filled a 
leadership vacuum in the area of corporate disclosure standards.  By the late 
1990s—a decade after the historic events of the Bhopal chemical tragedy in 
India and the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska—corporate transparency 
practices were becoming increasingly troublesome for both reporters and report 
users.  Although increasing numbers of corporations were disclosing their 
environmental and, to a lesser extent, social performance, the credibility of 
reports was severely undermined by the absence of an independent, neutral, 
legitimate mediating institution that could establish and steward a reporting 
framework.57  This was the need, and opportunity, that inspired the GRI. 
Second, unlike financial reporting, whose principal audience is investors, 
social and environmental information is of interest to a broader constituency.58  
To create a credible, generally accepted framework, the GRI had to create a 
process in which the views and voices of multiple constituencies were 
convincingly represented.  Thus, a multistakeholder approach to technical work 
and institutional governance became indispensable to the GRI from its earliest 
stages. 
Third, while many approaches to nonfinancial reporting had emerged in the 
late 1980s,59 the field was essentially in its infancy at the moment of the GRI’s 
conception.  This stands in contrast to seventy-five years of modern financial 
reporting, during which definitions, methods, and protocols have evolved into 
an elaborate, though still changing, accounting and reporting framework.  For 
the GRI, such uncharted terrain was both an impetus and a hurdle.  The 
impetus was the increasingly obvious shortcomings of financial reporting which 
were failing to keep pace with new determinants of corporate financial 
performance, such as knowledge assets, as well as new demands of noninvestors 
for nonfinancial disclosures.  The principal hurdle was, and still is, the challenge 
of elevating nonfinancial reporting to a level of general acceptance equivalent 
to financial reporting absent government mandates and institutions such as the 
FASB and the SEC. 
Unlike financial reporting, which evolved on a country-by-country basis, the 
GRI formed from the outset as a global framework.  It faced a clear pathway, 
 
as a component of its best corporate governance practices, and Japan’s environmental reporting 
guidelines (which in Japan is tantamount to mandatory) reflect evidence of a strong GRI fingerprint. 
 56. Examples of such efforts include the U.S. Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), The Netherlands 
Environmental Protection Act, and the Denmark Green Accounts Act.  KPMG, MANDATORY AND 
VOLUNTARY STANDARDS FOR SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 19–22 (2005) (draft discussion document 
for Sustainability Reporting: Public Policy Trends Workshop, hosted by the United Nations 
Environment Programme, on file with author). 
 57. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 54, at 4. 
 58. This constituency includes, for example, activists, employees, communities, consumers, and 
suppliers. 
 59. Various companies experimented with selected disclosures covering, for example, air or water 
pollutants.  But it was not until the formation of the American civil society group CERES in 1989 that 
the concept of systematic, comparable disclosures begin to take shape.  See Ceres, 
http://www.ceres.org/ceres/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2006). 
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relatively unimpaired by powerful competing institutions and traditions such as 
national financial accounting boards, professional accounting bodies, and 
securities commissions.  Although the GRI had to remain attentive to the many 
disparate corporate and national level efforts in nonfinancial reporting, a 
window of opportunity existed to build a global framework and institution 
without the inertia facing organizations such as the IASB. 
Fourth, the nature of nonfinancial reporting has required inventiveness that 
can learn from, but must recognize differences with, financial reporting.  Three 
examples illustrate this critical point:  principles of reporting,60 sector-specific 
disclosures,61 and qualitative indicators of performance.62 
In the case of principles of reporting, embedded in the concept and practice 
of financial reporting is a set of key elements that transcend specific rules, 
protocols, and metrics.  Examples include timeliness,63 completeness,64 and 
auditability.65  For nonfinancial reporting, the GRI developed similar principles 
to ensure rigor and comparability of reports that use the GRI framework.  But 
it did not simply import them wholesale from the financial domain.  The 
differences between the two reflect that nonfinancial reporting covers issues as 
wide-ranging as corporate governance, labor standards, product safety, and 
worker health, and speaks to wider audiences that include, but are not limited 
to, investors. 
Thus, the GRI’s reporting principles adapt to the familiar financial reporting 
principles, but also illuminate a “sustainability context”66 that situates reported 
information in a broader social and environmental context.67  Also embedded in 
the principles is the notion of “inclusiveness,”68 a signal to reporters that 
systematic stakeholder consultation is a precondition for shaping the final 
content and scope of disclosures contained in a GRI report.  Applied to a 
pharmaceutical company,69 for example, the GRI principles imply that such a 
company would make some reference to its role in addressing national or global 
health priorities such as affordable drugs, remedies for widespread tropical 
diseases, or combating the HIV–AIDS pandemic.  They also imply that the 
 
 60. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 54, at 22–31. 
 61. Id. at 10. 
 62. Id. at 44–56. 
 63. Id. at 30. 
 64. Id. at 26. 
 65. Id. at 25. 
 66. Id. at 27. 
 67. Such a context might include nationally or internationally recognized goals or targets which are 
beyond the boundaries of the reporting company. 
 68. Id. at 24. 
 69. As of October 2005, twenty-six “health care products” companies worldwide report using the 
GRI framework, including seven U.S.-based firms: Abbot Laboratories, Allergan, Baxter International, 
Bristol-Myers Squibb, Genecor International, Lilly, and Wyeth.  The remaining are companies based in 
the U.K., France, Germany, Japan, Ireland, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, and India.  Organisations 
Using the GRI Guidelines, http://www.globalreporting.org/guidelines/reports/search.asp (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2006) (select Health Care Products from Activity Sector drop-down menu; click Search). 
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ultimate content of such a report is based on serious consultations with the 
company’s stakeholders such as medical professionals, health care institutions, 
patient groups, and underserved communities. 
Sector-specific standards are a second point of divergence between financial 
and nonfinancial GRI reporting.  Why is this the case?  Mining, automotive, 
and financial services, for example, share certain attributes that are amenable to 
comparison.  All use energy in their products and services, pay different salary 
levels to employees, and are responsible for product and service safety.  
However, the significance of each shared attribute in assessing an organization’s 
social, environmental, and economic performance varies widely by sector.  For 
example, energy use in financial services represents a substantially smaller 
fraction of the firm’s total “footprint” than it does in an oil or automotive 
company. 
For this reason, the GRI’s reporting framework operates on two tiers:  the 
first is a generic set of indicators applicable to all sectors, while the second 
involves sector-specific indicators that capture the details of different types of 
organizations.70  Tons of carbon emitted per unit of production, reportable 
workplace accidents per 100,000 person-hours worked, and salary ratio between 
top-paid and average employees exemplify the range of measures that help 
assess and communicate nonfinancial performance for all companies.  But 
indicators such as production and sales of toxic substances and company 
policies regarding disclosure of drug trial information are germane only to 
specific types of companies.71  Whereas Wall Street is accustomed to a few 
leading financial indicators and indices, nonfinancial performance, with all its 
complexities, lacks a common denominator, such as dollars, and thus cannot be 
reduced to such elegance. 
Qualitative indicators are a third point of divergence, although this 
divergence is more one of weight than absolute difference.  Although financial 
accounting rules strive to produce comparable, quantitative results across 
companies, the resulting financial reports are routinely accompanied by 
nonquantitative information.72  This is expected by investors to aid in 
understanding a company’s strategy, technology innovations, competitive 
position, and other critical aspects of its operations and financial prospects.  
Information of this nature is actually required under SEC rules in so-called 
Management Decision and Analysis (MD&A)73 and similarly proposed in the 
 
 70. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 54, at 10. 
 71. In this case, companies at issue include producers and users of significant quantities of 
chemicals and drug companies, respectively. 
 72. Examples include information on new products under development, new markets targeted for 
the coming years, and recent mergers and acquisitions.  Also, financial reports typically include 
qualitative information such as political instability in conflict zones to alert investors to potential risks 
of investing in the firm. 
 73. Corporation Finance: Issues, Review of Fortune 500 Companies’ Periodic Reports, 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/fortune500rep.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2006). 
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United Kingdom under the heading of Operating and Financial Review.74  In 
both countries, and in others such as Canada, government regulators find 
themselves under increasing pressure to enlarge the scope of these disclosures 
to include environmental and social information that is pertinent to investor 
decisionmaking.75 
In the case of nonfinancial reporting, a much younger and more fluid field 
compared to financial reporting, no presumption of quantifiability exists.  A 
review of the 2002 GRI Guidelines reveals a broad spectrum across the fifty 
core indicators as well as additional, more experimental ones.76  This is because 
the consensus view of the GRI process is that characterizations of social, 
environmental, and economic performance require more than numbers.  They 
require textual explanations that reveal how and why boards think, 
management decides, employees behave, customers respond, and communities 
benefit from a company’s actions. 
This does not mean that reporters must choose between the two approaches. 
The optimal mix of the quantitative and qualitative disclosures varies across 
companies, sectors, and locations.  A start-up pharmaceutical company 
manufacturing generic drugs has a different story to tell, and a different way of 
telling its story, than a midsize firm that caters exclusively or primarily to 
American markets. 
VII 
PHARMA, AGAIN 
For the pharmaceutical industry, the implications of these emerging 
disclosure trends are profound and wide-reaching.  The sector is illustrative of a 
class of industries whose societal footprint makes them particularly vulnerable 
to intense mistrust during instances of transparency missteps and failures. 
Just weeks after the antidepressant disclosure episode made headline news, 
a second drug disclosure story with strikingly familiar features created its own 
waves in the medical, business, and governmental communities.77  “Good 
 
 74. After several special commissions spanning more than ten years led to proposed revisions to 
Company Law, U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer recently rejected recommendations to enlarge the 
scope of financial reporting by 1300 of the largest U.K. companies to include nonfinancial information.  
Gordon Brown MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Speech at the Confederation of British Industries 
Annual Conference (Nov. 28, 2005) available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/newsroom_and_ 
speeches/press/2005/press_99_05.cfm. 
 75. See, e.g., SANFORD LEWIS & TIM LITTLE, ROSE FOUNDATION FOR COMMUNITIES AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT, FOOLING INVESTORS & FOOLING THEMSELVES: HOW AGGRESSIVE CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTING & ASSET MANAGEMENT TACTICS CAN LEAD TO ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING 
FRAUD 35–40 (2004) (urging the SEC to require environmental disclosure).  In the U.K., social and 
environmental disclosures have been prominent in debates in the Company Law Review process. 
 76. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 54, at 39–59. 
 77. See, e.g., Eric J. Topol, Op-Ed., Good Riddance to a Bad Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2004, at 
A15 (criticizing the pharmaceutical company’s response and pointing to their conflict of interest as a 
primary cause). 
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Riddance to a Bad Drug” read an op-ed piece in a leading newspaper.78  The 
mix of medicine and money, prescriptions, and profits was again in play. 
This case involved Vioxx, an arthritic pain drug produced by Merck with 
annual sales of $2.5 billion, representing 11% of the company’s annual 
revenues, and used by two million people worldwide.79  An estimated eighty 
million people have used the drug.80  Vioxx is part of a family of drugs known as 
COX-2 inhibitors that generates sales of approximately $5 billion each year in 
the United States and $6 billion worldwide.81 
Merck’s decision to suddenly halt the sale of the drug, which was originally 
approved by FDA in 1999, came in the wake of rising concern about associated 
risks of heart attacks and strokes.  As early as 2001, a study published in the 
Journal of the American Medical Association found that Vioxx had a five-times-
greater risk than an over-the-counter anti-inflammatory with similar benefits.82  
In the following years, various studies of the risks and benefits of Vioxx were 
conducted,83 including the most recent study by Merck itself, which triggered the 
withdrawal of the drug. 84  The latter, focusing on the benefits of Vioxx in 
reducing colon polyps, yielded the surprising and “stunning” (in the words of 
Merck’s president of research) result that the drug increased the risk of heart 
attacks and strokes from 1.9% to 3.5% relative to a placebo.85 
Merck’s decision to withdraw the drug came at a high cost.  The company 
spent $45 million promoting the product in the first half of 2004 alone,86 an 
example of direct-to-consumer marketing that increasingly characterizes the 
industry.  Removal of the drug was as much a business story as a medical one.  
Merck’s stock fell 27%, and its market value fell by $25 billion.87  It was largely 
responsible for a decline of 0.6% in the Dow Jones Industrial average, the 
leading indicator of overall market performance. 
The Vioxx incident illustrates once again the complexities and crosscurrents 
of managing and disclosing critical-knowledge assets—in this case, those 
embodied in a leading revenue generator.  In the five years since its FDA 
approval, the drug was scrutinized for possible risks while at the same time 
company employees and their consultants published results that challenged 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Pfizer’s Celebrex and Bextra are in the same family; another six related drugs in development 
by Merck, Novartis, GSK, Pfizer, Yamanouchi, and Sankyo are in the FDA-approval process.  Andrew 
Pollack, New Scrutiny of Drugs in Vioxx’s Family, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2004, at C1. 
 82. Debabrata Mukherjee, Steven E. Nissen & Eric J. Topol, Risk of Cardiovascular Events 
Associated With Selective COX-2 Inhibitors, 286 JAMA 954, 954-59 (2001); Topol, supra note 77. 
 83. Topol, supra note 77. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Barry Meier, For Merck, Defense of a Drug Crumbles at a Difficult Time, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
2004, at C1. 
 87. Gina Kolata, Merck and Vioxx: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004, at A1. 
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such hypotheses.88  In April 2002, as a result of ongoing research, the FDA 
requested that Merck add heart attack risks to Vioxx’s label,89 which it did.  This 
easily missed form of disclosure to consumers is commonplace in the verbal and 
written warnings that accompany the direct-advertising campaigns appearing in 
the mass media. 
The larger context of the Vioxx story is one seen often in developing and 
marketing new drugs.  Trends in the pharmaceutical sector over many years 
reveal a changing business model.  Although large sums of funds support drug 
R&D, more than twice as much is spent on marketing and administration.90  
Moreover, the industry increasingly emphasizes the production of variations of 
existing products rather than the pursuit of novel breakthroughs.  The 
economics of this trend are compelling because patent protections can be 
granted for relatively minor changes in a drug’s composition.  If accompanied 
by effective advertising, these minor differences allow sibling drugs to generate 
new revenue streams while incurring relatively low R&D costs.  The economics 
are made even more favorable since the “R” in R&D is heavily subsidized by 
public support of the government’s vast medical research infrastructure. 
Disclosure practices in the $200 billion pharmaceutical sector91 are also 
influenced heavily by economic considerations.  Company involvement in 
funding and designing drug trials is pervasive.  A typical company-initiated 
study compares a drug’s effectiveness against a placebo, rather than against an 
existing drug of a comparable nature.  Drug trials, pre- and post-approval, are 
subject to negotiation with FDA, rather than decided by an independent body 
with no financial interests in their outcome and working in the public interest.  
The net result of these conditions is a bias in what appears in scientific journals 
and on labels:  information is effectively weighted as much by the financial 
interests of drug makers as by the need to understand and regulate the drugs 
themselves. 
This reticent-disclosure culture manifests itself in other aspects of reporting.  
With very few exceptions,92 nonfinancial reporting among drug companies lags 
behind many other sectors in terms of best practice.  While the GRI has been 
embraced by the telecommunications, financial services, automotive, and other 
industries as they develop sector-specific reporting frameworks, the 
 
 88. Topol, supra note 77. 
 89. See id. 
 90. MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US 
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 49 (2004). 
 91. Id. at 3.  This is the amount Americans spent on prescription drugs in 2002.  Sales worldwide 
are in the $400 billion range.  Id. at 5. 
 92. Novo Nordisk, the Danish diabetes drug firm, is the most notable.  Its corporate social 
reporting is widely regarded as the best in the sector and among the best in any sector.  See, e.g., 
Business for Social Responsibility, http://www.bsr.org/CSRResources/Magazine/leadership.cfm? 
DocumentID=767&DocumentTypeID=8 (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).  Also noteworthy is Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, among the pioneers of GRI reporting, though its emphasis has been heavily environmental.  
Additionally, Novartis’s report is noteworthy for its consolidation of financial and nonfinancial 
information. 
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pharmaceutical sector, intensely competitive and highly sensitive to proprietary 
information, has resisted this initiative.  Though most of the major firms 
produce some type of nonfinancial “sustainability,” “social,” or “citizenship” 
report,93 it is rare that such reports represent leading-edge disclosure standards. 
The irony of this situation is that drug companies, more than most other 
industries, represent a sector whose business encompasses quality and quantity 
of life.  However skewed its priorities and practices are toward competitive 
advantage and near-term financial gains, it retains the responsibility of 
preserving the lives of millions.  Yet by current disclosure standards, either at 
the specific drug or corporate level, it is difficult to find leading practices.  The 
recent stories of antidepressants and arthritic drugs are a reminder of how 
serious the shortfalls are and how far the industry has to go before meeting 
emerging global expectations and standards of disclosure. 
VIII 
CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD 
All signs point to the continued emergence of social, environmental, and 
economic disclosures as integral and indispensable components of corporate 
responsibility.  This evolution, still little more than a decade old, remains a 
work in progress in terms of scope, scale, and content.  It reflects the character 
of financial disclosure a half century ago—formative and experimental. 
For companies operating in global markets, a shift in perception and 
practice relative to disclosure is clearly discernable.  In the 1990s, a few 
pioneering companies in North America and Europe, often prompted by bad 
press surrounding environmental and human rights incidences, began 
publishing nonfinancial reports.94  These early innovators were followed by 
hundreds more who began to see such reports as an emerging best practice.  By 
2003, more than 1500 companies had adopted the procedure, and each year 
witnesses a steady increase in numbers.95  This trend continues today.96 
As nonfinancial reporting swiftly moves from extraordinary to exceptional 
to expected, the case for global standards becomes more compelling.  Full and 
balanced disclosure is taking its place alongside labor, environmental, and 
human rights as a generally accepted universal norm for business.  Like these 
rights, the “right to know” is part of doing business in the twenty-first century.  
Integration of global capital markets, the capacity of information technology to 
virtually instantaneously transmit both good and bad news, and sales of 
products and services worldwide create both a business and an ethical 
foundation for full disclosure. 
 
 93. Organisations, supra note 69. 
 94. Polaroid Corporation and Royal Dutch Shell are examples of early reporters spurred by, 
respectively, environmental and human rights issues. 
 95. ACCA, TOWARDS TRANSPARENCY: PROGRESS ON GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 
2004 8 (2004) available at http://www.accaglobal.com/pdfs/environment/towards_trans_2004.pdf. 
 96. KPMG, supra note 56, at 3–5. 
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The case of pharmaceutical firms forcefully illustrates this point.  The 
handful of firms that dominate global markets sell their products worldwide.  
There simply is no justification for multiplicative disclosure standards across 
countries or regions.  Critical information on company R&D programs, drug 
trial activities, and marketing practices is of equal interest to American, 
Japanese, and South African consumers, investors, and other company 
stakeholders.  As the recent antidepressant and arthritis drug cases reveal, the 
consequences of company decisions, like the companies themselves, know no 
frontiers. 
The contours of a generally accepted disclosure framework are identifiable 
at this juncture, especially at the generic, cross-sectoral level.  At the same time, 
details of sector-specific disclosures remain fluid.  For pharmaceutical 
companies, for example, when and in what form should drug trial information 
be disclosed?  In what form, qualitative or quantitative, should lobbying 
activities, funding of academic institutions, and relationships with medical 
professionals be disclosed?  Achieving the levels of rigor and comparability 
essential for credibility will take time.  The issues need to be articulated, the 
indicators defined, and the measurement protocols developed. 
Company stakeholders are a diverse and dispersed group, but all have a 
right to know what is relevant to their decisions as consumers, investors, 
workers, and community members.  The consequences of deferred, incomplete, 
or inaccurate information are too evident and too frequent.  The greater the 
social, environmental, and economic footprint of the sector, the more urgent is 
the need to move rapidly toward generally accepted disclosure standards at the 
global level. 
“Information is the Best Medicine” reads the headline of a recent 
commentary on the antidepressant controversy.97  This fundamental truth must 
be translated into steady progress toward global disclosure standards in 
pharmaceuticals and, no less urgently, in all business sectors that constitute the 
twenty-first century global economy. 
 
 97. John Abramson, Information is the Best Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2004, at A27. 
